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Abstract—As devices in the Internet of Things (IoT) increase
in number and integrate with everyday lives, large amounts of
personal information will be generated. With multiple discovered
vulnerabilities in current IoT networks, a malicious attacker
might be able to get access to and misuse this personal data.
Thus, a logger that stores this information securely would make
it possible to perform forensic analysis in case of such attacks
that target valuable data. In this paper, we propose LogSafe,
a scalable, fault-tolerant logger that leverages the use of Intel
Software Guard Extensions (SGX) to store logs from IoT devices
efﬁciently and securely. Using the security guarantees of SGX,
LogSafe is designed to run on an untrusted cloud infrastructure
and satisﬁes Conﬁdentiality, Integrity, and Availability (CIA)
security properties. Finally, we provide an exhaustive evaluation
of LogSafe in order to demonstrate that it is capable of handling
logs from a large number of IoT devices and at a very high data
transmission rate.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the sharp increase in popularity and use of the Internet
of Things (IoT), these devices are bound to accumulate exten-
sive information about users and their activities. The diverse
and ad-hoc nature of IoT networks, however, raises concerns
both about the privacy and security of the collected data.
As shown in several cases, it is possible to uncover private
information (e.g., living habits and home addresses) from
IoT data through simple appliances such as Nest thermostats
[1] and Sharx security cameras [2]. Moreover, IoT devices
themselves are vulnerable to various cyber-physical attacks
as they are deployed without proper security measures (e.g.,
Mirai botnet attack [3], SSHowDowN proxy attacks [4]).
As securing all IoT devices is not feasible, it is essential
to be able to perform forensic analysis on the IoT data. Such
analysis would ensure both that IoT data is managed securely
and that attacks on IoT devices are detected and addressed.
A necessary condition for such accurate forensics is secure
data collection, from a potentially large number of devices,
in a tamper-evident and fault-tolerant fashion. In particular,
end-to-end security guarantees must be provided, beginning
from the communication protocol and ending with secure data
storage that provides defenses against unauthorized accesses
and attacks. Therefore, this paper addresses the problem of
designing a secure and scalable logger for IoT devices.
To support large-scale data logging, cloud service providers
such as Amazon, Google, IBM, and Microsoft have emerged
as services that allow users of IoT devices to store and manage
their data on a cloud infrastructure. The ease of use and
integration with other well-known computation and storage
services on the same platform is one of the best selling points
for these providers. However, there have been several recent
security breaches on online services such as Yahoo [5], Ashley
Madison [6], and Equifax [7] that potentially affect hundreds
of millions of users. Moreover, for proprietary reasons, the
precise architecture of these commercial services is not known,
which makes it difﬁcult to evaluate their security guarantees.
Without using cloud services, users can choose to deploy
logging infrastructure themselves and adequately manage their
services. This approach poses the challenge of scalability
as administrating a large-scale system needs corresponding
resources and expertise. In addition, users can only beneﬁt
from running their own infrastructure if the security guarantees
are equal or better than cloud services, which are not usually
available for the regular consumers (e.g., controlled physical
access).
To leverage the advantages of both approaches, namely use
the cloud infrastructure but also maintain control of the sys-
tem’s security, we propose LogSafe, a scalable, fault-tolerant
logger that provides secure storage of IoT data. Designed to
run on the cloud infrastructure, LogSafe is a decentralized
logging architecture using Intel Software Guard Extensions
(SGX) and standard industrial protocols to guarantee tamper-
resilience. SGX is a set of new instructions and memory access
changes in Intel architecture design that allows the creation
of an enclave, a trusted and isolated execution environment.
Enclaves enable applications to maintain conﬁdentiality even
when an attacker has physical control of the host machine.
Therefore, users can utilize cloud service provider infrastruc-
ture and services without worrying about the security and
privacy of recorded data. LogSafe also provides the capability
to perform online computation on logged data while preserving
privacy, e.g., for the purpose of audit or attack detection.
The secure logger presented in this paper is required to
satisfy the Conﬁdentiality, Integrity, and Availability (CIA)
model, a widely adopted model for assessing the security prop-
erties of a given system. Building such a logger in a distributed
fashion on the cloud presents several challenges. LogSafe
employs Transport Layer Security (TLS) with hashchaining
logging scheme [8] and digital signature scheme to guarantee
conﬁdentiality and integrity properties. However, even with
hashchaining, integrity can be still violated by a replay attack,
where an eavesdropper gets a copy of legitimate stored data
and at a later time overwrites the current data.
In order to defend against replay attacks, we use the SGX
physical monotonic counter to maintain the latest system
state as a trusted platform storage. As shown in Section VI,
monotonic counter operations are computationally costly and
can signiﬁcantly reduce the system performance if frequently
used. To deal with this challenge, we introduce a snapshot
algorithm utilizing the SGX counter to defend against replay
attacks without compromising the scalability and performance
of the system. Speciﬁcally, LogSafe uses a fast, secure in-
memory counter for node run-time veriﬁcation and the slower,
permanent counter for long-term veriﬁcation. This combina-
tion allows logged data to be veriﬁed at any time regardless
of system topology changes.
Availability presents its own challenges that arise due to
communication overhead (e.g., encryption, gossip protocol)
and computation overhead (e.g., cryptographic operations).
LogSafe minimizes the performance hit by employing a dis-
tributed architecture with decentralized SGX-enabled nodes
that can quickly scale up to support a large number of IoT
devices. Nodes are organized in a fault-tolerant ring structure
(where each node is backed-up by one or two other nodes),
and each IoT device is mapped to a speciﬁc node based on
a consistent hashing algorithm. Finally, note that availability
can also be violated by a distributed denial-of-service (DDoS)
attack – defending against DDoS attacks is an active area of
research, so we leave addressing this problem for future work;
at the same time, we note that the fault-tolerant architecture of
LogSafe ensures that its operation will not be disrupted even
if some of its nodes are attacked.
To evaluate the LogSafe implementation, we ﬁrst investigate
the computational overhead of establishing a secure connection
between IoT devices and LogSafe. To assess the scalability of
the design, we vary the number of nodes in the system from
one to three and observe the change in average processing time
per incoming message. Finally, we compare the performance
of LogSafe with a non-SGX implementation as well as with
previous SGX-based implementations that use a single node
[9], [10]. The results indicate that LogSafe is scalable to
support a large number of devices for fast logging with very
reasonable computation overhead.
To summarize, the contributions of this paper are three-fold:
1) the design and implementation of LogSafe, a cloud-based
secure, scalable, and fault-tolerant logger that can accommo-
date a large number of IoT devices; 2) a scalable snapshot
algorithm to defend against attacks without compromising the
logger’s performance; 3) performance evaluation of the logger
implementation to test its scalability properties.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We
discuss related work in Section II. In Section III, we present
a system overview and provide the problem statement. Sec-
tion IV then discusses the design architecture of the secure
logger and explains the components of the design. We discuss
the implementation of LogSafe in Section V. Finally, we
present the experimental results of LogSafe in Section VI and
provide concluding remarks in Section VII.
II. RELATED WORK
Protecting valuable data from adversaries is an active area of
research, and there has been a signiﬁcant amount of work done
on developing tamper-proof loggers for storing information.
Secure loggers can generally be classiﬁed into those that
implement security in software and assume the underlying
hardware is attack-free or the ones that implement a secure
hardware. Works that use the former design [11]–[14] rely on
published commitments to enable tamper-proof service and
require a gossip protocol for distribution, which do not scale
well in IoT environment with massive scale and spontaneous
interaction between devices. On the other hand, works that
implement the latter design [15]–[17] use the Trusted Platform
Module (TPM) [18] as a trusted computing base to guarantee
tamper-proofness. These techniques either assume an adver-
sary who cannot perform sophisticated hardware attacks (e.g.,
probing memory or launching side-channel attacks) or rely on
changing the TPM speciﬁcations to provide their guarantees.
Some recent designs [9], [19] propose the use of SGX to
defend against a stronger adversary capable of active attacks
on the system, leveraging the higher computation capability
of SGX in comparison with the previous trusted hardware
platforms. Like LogSafe, they maintain a hashchain of logging
states as a secure timeline and use SGX to provide a trusted ex-
ecution environment. Unlike LogSafe, however, these designs
are solely for a single computer deployment without fault-
tolerant guarantees. SGX-Log [19] encrypts data using SGX
sealing feature and can only be decrypted using the same pro-
cessor, which is unlikely to happen in the cloud environment.
Moreover, previous designs rely on SGX monotonic counter
(known to be very slow due to interactions with non-volatile
memory) for frequent operations, and it is challenging to scale
these approaches to the IoT space where interactions with
millions of devices might occur. LogSafe does not require
SGX monotonic counter for normal operation; it also fully
utilizes the cloud infrastructure with distributed architecture
to provide scalability and fault tolerance.
SGX has been suggested as a means to build secure systems
from an untrusted cloud in a number of works. Haven [20]
is the ﬁrst system to provide a shielded environment to exe-
cute legacy Windows applications using SGX. Secure Linux
containers such as SCONE [21], Graphene-SGX [22], or
Panoply [23] can also be used to run unmodiﬁed applications
in a trusted enclave. These systems provide greater ﬂexibility
for an application running inside the enclave at the cost
of higher overhead to encapsulate system functionalities. As
the memory available inside the enclave is limited (about
98MB with the current SGX hardware version), this overhead
will affect the scalability of the system. LogSafe is designed
with the speciﬁc logging functionality by executing only core
cryptographic operations inside the enclave and proved to be
scalable and fault-tolerant to support a high number of IoT
devices.
Other works also propose SGX for secure cloud analytics
such as VC3 [24] with secure MapReduce computations or
IRON [25] with secure functional encryption. These algo-
rithms can be used in conjunction with LogSafe to provide
multi-party analytics over logged data.
III. OVERVIEW OF THE IOT LOGGING ARCHITECTURE
This section ﬁrst introduces the background of Intel SGX
and gives an overview of the proposed system with the security
properties such a system should provide. Then, it outlines the
possible attack surfaces that could affect those properties as
well as our approach to ensure that the system does provide
them.
A. Intel SGX Background
SGX was designed by Intel in order to address the problem
of executing software applications in a remote computer
owned by an untrusted party, while at the same time providing
integrity and privacy guarantees [26]. At a high level, SGX is a
set of new instructions and memory access changes in the Intel
architecture; it works by instantiating an enclave at the remote
computer for the purposes of computation and information
exchange. The enclave is essentially a secure, separated and
encrypted region for code and data are decrypted only inside
the processor.
The enclave enables applications to maintain conﬁdentiality
even when an attacker has physical control of the platform.
Special CPU instructions, such as EENTER (to execute the
code inside the enclave) and EEXIT (to quit execution), must
be used by the enclave’s host process to interact with the
enclave, and it happens in protected mode. Exceptions are
raised when a non-enclave access to a memory is attempted
by a software, and also when a code fetch is attempted from
inside an enclave to an address range outside that enclave.
Therefore, SGX ensures that the secure regions of code and
data are able to maintain conﬁdentiality even when an attacker
has physical control of the platform and can conduct direct
attacks on memory.
Each SGX-enabled processor is fused with a speciﬁc key
during the manufacturing process that can be used to encrypt
and integrity-protect sensitive data. To store the secret on
untrusted memory, an enclave program can call EGETKEY
instruction to derive an encryption key from the persistent
hardware-based key. This encryption key can only be retrieved
by instances of the same enclave program on the same
platform. This sealing feature ensures that sensitive data are
isolated between enclaves or even between different versions
of the same enclave program (e.g., an older vulnerable version
cannot access sealed data from a newer version).
SGX also provides a remote attestation mechanism to allow
another party to verify that the correct program is securely
running within an enclave on the remote platform. An enclave
can use the EREPORT instruction to generate an unforgeable
report containing information to verify the trustworthiness
of the enclave and the platform. The report is signed using
a private key for Intel Enhanced Privacy ID (EPID), an
anonymous group signature scheme. The party can validate
Fig. 1: The LogSafe system overview.
the report and contact Intel Attestation Server (IAS) to verify
the signature of the report.
The SGX security is formally proved in [25]. However,
SGX also has limitations, especially vulnerability against side-
channel attacks [26]–[29]. Therefore, it is the responsibility
of the enclave program implementation to defend against
side-channel attacks. Fisch et al. [25] also present different
techniques to defend against such attacks.
B. System Overview
Figure 1 shows the logger’s intended environment. LogSafe
is to be deployed in a vast IoT network that may potentially
contain a very large number of devices (ranging in the billions
according to some current estimates [30]). Since IoT devices
are generally resource constrained devices (e.g., ﬁtness track-
ing devices, medical devices) that do not have the capacity
to perform computation-heavy operations or to store great
amounts of data, the logger’s task would be to securely store
all data generated by these devices as well as to provide a
platform to compute certain functions on the logged data (e.g.,
sensor attack detection) without revealing any information to
unauthorized entities.
Due to the unprecedented size of IoT networks, developing
and managing the infrastructure for such a logger system
would be a challenging task. That is why, in this work
we propose to leverage the existing cloud infrastructure and
augment it with the security features of SGX. In particular,
each machine on the cloud would be capable of running an
SGX enclave;1 in turn, the security guarantees provided by
SGX, namely remote attestation and secure computing, would
make it possible to securely execute code on the cloud without
exposing information to the cloud provider or the rest of the
world.
In order to exploit the full capacity of the cloud, LogSafe
is distributed as well (refer to Section IV for a description
of the speciﬁc design of the distributed logging system). This
allows us both to handle a larger number of incoming messages
and to provide an extra layer of fault/attack tolerance as
opposed to a centralized system with a single point of failure.
1This is a reasonable assumption considering that all new generations of
Intel desktop/laptop chips and some server chips are capable of running SGX.
In case a machine crashes or experiences denial of service,
LogSafe would transfer its state and responsibilities to a back-
up machine, thus ensuring the seamless execution of the entire
system.
In this framework, a single trusted authority platform (run-
ning locally) can provision an arbitrary number of SGX-
enabled nodes running on the cloud infrastructure. Once an
IoT device sends (encrypted) data to the logger node, LogSafe
veriﬁes the authenticity of the data, encrypts it with the
provisioned encryption key and sends it to the cloud database
service (e.g., Amazon RDS) for permanent storage. This
ensures that data is only decrypted within an SGX enclave
and cannot be accessed from the outside. In a similar fashion,
LogSafe provides a platform for secure computation as well –
if a user would like to perform computation on the logged data,
an SGX enclave would retrieve the data from the database,
decrypt it and securely perform the required computation, only
returning the answer to the user (e.g., saying that no attacks
were detected).
C. Security Discussion
Due to its application domain, namely a large IoT network
that is constantly subjected to outside threats, LogSafe is
exposed to a number of attack surfaces. In this work, we
focus on building a system that satisﬁes the CIA model,
a standard model in the cyber security domain. We utilize
different techniques in order to (attempt to) achieve each of
the three CIA properties, as discussed below.
Conﬁdentiality means that IoT data cannot be seen by
unauthorized entities (e.g., through an eavesdropping attack).
LogSafe attains this property by employing the TLS protocol;
TLS provides end-to-end security between the devices and
LogSafe by ensuring that messages are encrypted, hashed, and
signed. Thus, by making the standard assumptions about the
hardness of prime number factorization, we can make sure that
IoT data is only readable inside an SGX enclave.
Integrity is achieved when the data that is logged (and re-
trieved later) is the same as the data that was originally sent by
an IoT device. Integrity can be violated in systems vulnerable
to injection attacks where the attacker is able to modify the
data stored in the database. LogSafe defends against injection
attacks by using a hashchain [8] algorithm in order to ensure
that the logged data is consistent and in the right order. Even in
this case, integrity can also be violated by a variant of a replay
attack in which the attacker replaces the latest logged data with
a previous authentic snapshot – in this case the data is still
consistent but is incomplete. In order to address this issue,
we use the monotonic (physical) counter provided by SGX,
which serves as a checkpointing mechanism; by verifying that
the counter stored on the database is equal to the one in SGX,
we can ensure that the data that was last received is indeed
stored on the database.
In addition to attacks on the database itself, attacks on IoT
devices can also compromise the integrity of the logged data.
In particular, since most IoT devices are not developed with
security features in mind, they might be easily corrupted and,
consequently, transmit wrong data to LogSafe. To detect such
scenarios, LogSafe provides a platform for secure computa-
tion where existing attack detection techniques [31] can be
executed inside an SGX enclave without revealing any data to
the outside world, except for the output of the computation.
Finally, availability holds when the system is able to handle
all messages and requests that it receives. Availability is difﬁ-
cult to guarantee in the worst case because there are no known
fail-safe techniques for defending against DDoS attacks. At the
same time, by developing a distributed system on the cloud
(possibly on multiple clusters), we can alleviate the effect
of DDoS attacks by requiring attackers to compromise many
more machines in order to disrupt the functionality of LogSafe.
With the above considerations in mind, we can now con-
cisely state the problem addressed by this paper and LogSafe.
Problem: This paper addresses the problem of how to design
and implement a distributed cloud-based logger for IoT de-
vices using SGX. The logger must satisfy the CIA properties in
the presence of eavesdropping, injection, and replay attacks.
IV. DESIGN OF LOGSAFE
In this section, we describe the architecture and the various
components of the logger design (for easy reference, the
architecture diagram is presented in Figure 2). Note that our
design makes the following (standard) assumptions that ensure
the logger security properties are satisﬁed:
• SGX is implemented correctly and not compromised,
• cryptographic primitives such as RSA and Advanced
Encryption Standard (AES) encryption are safe,
• an attacker cannot forge digital signatures, and
• the hash function is collision-resistant.
A. High Level Data Flow
This subsection describes at a high level the data ﬂow within
LogSafe during its operation; the speciﬁcs of each phase are
described in their corresponding subsections of this section.
The IoT device initiates the protocol by establishing the secure
connection with the Logger. After authenticating each other
(i.e., validate the certiﬁcates), the Logger checks if it already
has the required information to process requests from the IoT
device. If not, it requests provisioning from the Manager to
acquire needed device’s meta-data and seal this information for
further usage (Step 2 in Figure 2); the Manager is described
in more detail in Section IV-D.
Upon receiving the data message, the Logger enclave ﬁrst
calculates entry id, a monotonically increasing sequence
number that is incremented after each message and is stored in
the volatile memory of each Logger. Then the Logger encrypts
the received data using the device’s encryption key provided
by the Manager and generates the next hashchain block
following the tamper-evident logging scheme. As discussed in
Section IV-E below, hashchaining ensures that injection attacks
can be detected by storing a consistent hashed version of all
logged data; this hash also contains entry id such that the
order of message arrival can also be veriﬁed in the hash chain.
Fig. 2: LogSafe architecture and data ﬂow.
On the cloud platform, nodes are expected to fail or crash –
in such a scenario, the crashed node cannot provide entry id
for log veriﬁcation. Therefore, before making any changes in
the persistent storage, the Logger will send the latest entry id
to its successor node to back up the latest state of this device
(Step 4 in Figure 2). To ensure consistency, LogSafe only
processes requests from a device sequentially.
Even with backup nodes, all the device states are still
kept in the volatile memory and would not be available after
the cluster is shut down. Therefore, nodes occasionally send
device states to Trackers for a snapshot backup. The snapshot
algorithm (described in Section IV-F) is essentially another
hash chain log of the device states, but more importantly, it
uses SGX counters (non-volatile memory) for version tracking.
To verify if an IoT device’s log is the latest version (replay
attack detection), the auditor can query the corresponding node
serving the device if it is still active. Otherwise, it can trace
back the snapshot data and query the tracker’s SGX counter
to validate the freshness of the snapshot.
In the following subsections, we ﬁrst provide the features
that support LogSafe architecture. After that, we reﬁne the
high level data ﬂow into a practical system:
• LogSafe consists of a decentralized distributed cluster
(Section IV-B) to guarantee high-availability and fault
tolerance.
• IoT devices need to establish a secure connection follow-
ing a handshake protocol (Section IV-C) with LogSafe
before being able to send log. Both IoT device and
LogSafe must be authenticated during the protocol, which
might require provisioning (Section IV-D) from the local
trusted authority.
• LogSafe requires both fast, in-memory counter (Sec-
tion IV-E) for node run-time veriﬁcation and slow, per-
manent counter (Section IV-F) for long-term veriﬁcation.
• LogSafe also provides a secure computing platform (Sec-
tion IV-G) for log auditing and attack detection.
B. Distributed Logger Cluster
The heart of LogSafe is a decentralized cluster of Logger
nodes, i.e., there is no centralized control or hierarchical
organization between the nodes. The Logger cluster uses
Chord [32] as the distributed look up protocol, where given
each IoT device is mapped to a Logger node using the device’s
id as key. Chord uses a consistent hashing algorithm to
efﬁciently assign IoT devices to the corresponding nodes. The
consistent hashing also reduce device assignment movement
when nodes are added to and removed from the system.
Availability is the main reason LogSafe is designed in the
distributed architecture. The cluster can be seen as an n-node
ring (to support consistent hashing), where n is the maximum
number of nodes that join the system at any given time. De-
pending on the workload, the user can choose to add or remove
nodes to balance the needs without much effect on the system
performance. In addition, LogSafe also provides fault tolerance
as each Logger’s state (containing information about all IoT
devices connected to it) is always replicated in (conﬁgurable
Fig. 3: Handshake protocol.
number) backup nodes. If the primary Logger fails, the IoT
device can switch to a backup node for continuous operation.
The backup node then continues to replicate the state to ensure
the replication factor is always met.
Since SGX does not support I/O operations (i.e., every
call to the I/O needs to leave the encrypted enclave, and re-
enter with the results), LogSafe is managed in a decentralized
fashion to avoid a single point of failure with an SGX node
handling a high number of I/O requests. There is also a possi-
bility that Logger node’s operating system is compromised and
affects the network stack. This could at most result in DDoS
(i.e., the node looks unresponsive to the IoT device or other
nodes). One way to mitigate the problem is allocating nodes in
different zones of the data center, or even different data centers
to minimize the number of nodes that can be attacked at the
same time. As long as LogSafe still has correct functional
nodes, it can detect anomalies and re-balance the system.
C. Handshake Protocol between IoT Device and LogSafe
Once an IoT device is mapped to a Logger node, the
two devices must ﬁrst establish a secure connection (by
following the TLS handshake procedure). Once connection
is established, the IoT device starts transmitting data to the
logger. A typical message exchange between an IoT device
and the logger is presented in Figure 3.
To establish a connection, the IoT device ﬁrst initiates the
handshake protocol by sending a Device Hello message
with cryptographic information such as the TLS version, along
with the cipher suites supported by the client. In response,
the logger replies with an SGX Hello message that contains
the chosen cipher suite along with its digital certiﬁcate. Upon
receiving the device’s certiﬁcate, the logger ﬁrst veriﬁes the
certiﬁcate authenticity, then checks whether the untrusted
storage (i.e., the database) already has sealed device meta-
data (i.e., encryption key). If the meta-data does not exist, the
logger will start provisioning protocol with the manager as
described in the following subsection. Otherwise, it will unseal
the meta-data into memory and query the latest log entry from
the database cluster to restore the hashchain. Finally, the logger
ﬁnishes the handshake protocol by sending an SGX Finish
message.
Note that an AES symmetric session key is also agreed
upon during the handshake; it is used by the IoT device for
data encryption in all communication henceforth.
D. The Manager and Provisioning Protocol
LogSafe requires a local trusted platform to function as the
Manager, responsible for provisioning both the IoT devices
and the logger nodes running on the cloud. The idea is that
the LogSafe user can run a single Manager node (even on
a non-SGX machine) locally in order to be able to manage
LogSafe on the cloud infrastructure.
Each IoT device can be provisioned during the manufactur-
ing process with a unique identiﬁer id, a private/public key pair
(pkd, skd), the corresponding trusted root certiﬁcate, and the
Tracker’s addresses. This key pair is only used for establishing
a secure TLS connection with the logger node. In addition, an
encryption key skenc is also generated for the device, but this
key is stored only in the Manager for further provisioning with
the logger node.
LogSafe can have an arbitrary number of nodes running on
the cloud. Each Logger instance is essentially an untrusted
application, which loads the signed binary of the logger
enclave program. As these Logger nodes are managed by the
cloud service provider, they need to be correctly veriﬁed before
the Manager sends any sensitive information to the nodes, e.g.,
the key pairs (pkl, skl) to establish the TLS connection with
IoT devices, the key pairs (pksign, sksign) to sign encrypted
log entry, and device encryption key skenc. The veriﬁcation
process can be done via SGX remote attestation as shown in
Figure 3 and detail below.
To initiate remote attestation, Logger sends a requests to
receive a random challenge from Manager (to prevent ses-
sion reuse). Next, the Logger sends the Extended Group ID
(GID) of EPID to the Manager to be veriﬁed, followed by
a modiﬁed Sigma protocol (i.e., involves three-step structure:
commitment, challenge, and response – showing as Sigma
S1, S2, and S3 in Figure 3), during which Logger and
Manager also perform a Difﬁe-Hellman Key Exchange for
secure communication. After receiving Sigma S3, which
contains the report from the Logger, the Manager can contact
IAS server to validate the authenticity of the report. If the
Logger is veriﬁed, it will received provisioning information
from the Manager via the established secure connection.
E. Tamper-evident Logging Scheme
Once the initial handshake is complete and LogSafe has
received the data message, it initiates the logging procedure.
Algorithm 1 Logging Algorithm
Logger State:
entry idk−1 ← previous log entry ID //(id0 = 0)
hk−1 ← previous hash value //(h0 = 0)
Input:
id ← device ID
ck ← current message content
Parameters:
skenc ← device encryption key
sksign ← logger private key
1: procedure ADDENTRY(id, content ck)
2: entry idk ← entry idk−1 + 1
3: enc datak ← ENCRYPT(entry idk||ck, skenc)
4: hk ← hash(hk−1||entry idk||ck)
5: shk ← sign(hk, sksign)
6: BACKUPCOUNTER(id, entry idk)
7: WRITE(id, entry idk, enc datak, hk, shk)
8: ACKNOWLEDGE(id)
The complete logging scheme is presented in Algorithm 1.
Upon receiving a new data message, the logger enclave ﬁrst
calculates the entry ID entry idk, a monotonically increasing
sequence number and is incremented after each message.
Given entry idk, the logger now encrypts the received data,
concatenated with the sequence number (Line 3 in Algo-
rithm 1); the data is encrypted using the corresponding IoT
device’s encryption key, as provided by the Manager.
In addition, for tamper detection reasons, we compute the
hash hk of all the information related to the current message
(sequence number and the message), together with the hash of
the previous message hk−1 (Line 4 in Algorithm 1). The hash
hk is then signed by the logger enclave using the enclave’s
private key sksign (Line 5 in Algorithm 1). As discussed in [8],
this hash chain ensures that the proper message sequence is
preserved, such that any attempt to change message content
will create a different hash chain branching off at the affected
log entry, thereby enabling us to detect the data tampering.
In summary, for each device the logger stores two classes
of information – the encrypted data (encrypted using the
corresponding device’s encryption key) and a hash of the data,
together with the hash of previous message. This hash chain
ensures the tamper-evident property of the logger by detecting
any data modiﬁcations by external entities (e.g., the attacker
modifying the contents stored on disk).
F. Counter Snapshot Protocol
The mechanisms described so far ensure that stored log can
be appropriately veriﬁed when Logger node is running. We
also need to make sure that the security properties still hold
even when user shuts down the cluster. One way to achieve
this is having each node seal the system state upon shutdown.
This approach might not be suitable for the cloud environment
Algorithm 2 Snapshot Algorithm
Tracker State:
sk−1 ← previous sequence number //(s0 = 0)
hk−1 ← previous hash value //(h0 = 0)
Input:
id ← device ID
entry idk ← latest entry counter from the device
Parameters:
tracker id ← tracker ID
sksign ← tracker private key
counter id ← monotonic counter ID
1: procedure ADDSNAPSHOT(id, entry idk)
2: sk ← sk−1 + 1
3: hk ← hash(hk−1||id||entry idk||sk)
4: shk ← sign(hk, sksign)
5: WRITE(tracker id, counter id,
sk, id, entry idk, hk, shk)
6: ACKNOWLEDGE(id)
where physical machines are usually assigned to different users
depends on priorities and workload.
LogSafe makes sure long term stored log can still be veriﬁed
via the use of the Tracker node for snapshots. This node can
be replicated (by a factor of two in Figure 2) to ensure fault-
tolerance. Tracker functions very similarly to Logger node,
with two main differences: (1) instead of creating logs for IoT
devices, it creates snapshots for device latest counter values;
(2) Tracker uses SGX physical monotonic counter instead of
memory variable.
SGX monotonic counters are available via Platform Service
Enclave, with up to 256 counters available [33], identiﬁed by
a counter ID and a nonce. Each operation with the counter is
performed on non-volatile memory such that an enclave with
the same signing key can access the counter to read/increment
even after the machine is shut down/rebooted.
With the SGX monotonic counter, the snapshot algorithm
is presented in Algorithm 2. In addition to the use of phys-
ical monotonic counter and different generated content, the
snapshot algorithm just creates the hashchain and signature
without encrypting the data. The reason is these information
are already available in plaintext on Logger storage. We only
need to guarantee the authenticity and freshness of the data
stored in snapshots. Since the operations with monotonic
counter are very slow, we aim to minimize snapshot creation
in speciﬁc cases: logger cluster shutdown, IoT device inactive
for a ﬁxed period of time (e.g., Logger node can temporary
free memory for other devices).
In summary, given both in-memory Logger counter and
permanent Tracker counter, LogSafe allows logged data to be
veriﬁed at any time regardless of system topology changes.
G. Secure Computation
Although the logging scheme presented in the previous
subsections provides tamper evidence if the logged data have
been changed, it does not address the case where the IoT de-
vice itself might be under attack, possibly transmitting wrong
information for storage. In order to handle such a scenario,
LogSafe also supports delegating secure computation (e.g.,
attack detection) on the logged data. The idea is very similar to
IRON’s secure functional encryption [25], such that functional
enclaves can be deployed to the cloud to securely decrypt the
sensitive data, perform the prescripted computations, and only
return the result to the user. Note that system designers need
to approve any such computation before it is allowed to run
on the enclave (in other words, arbitrary computation is not
allowed because a malicious node might ask for all the data,
for example).
There are various techniques can be used to detect possible
IoT attacks, such as model-based approaches [34], sensor and
information fusion [31], [35], as well as data-driven machine
learning approaches [36]. These algorithms, along with the
hashchain veriﬁcation algorithm [9] can be implemented as
query primitives and provisioned to nodes on the cloud by the
Manager. It can perform remote attestation to ensure the node
is correctly started before giving decryption key to the node so
that the cloud services can regularly execute audits for attack
detection.
V. IMPLEMENTATION
We implemented the LogSafe prototype in C++ with four
applications: IoT Device, Logger, Tracker, and Manager.
These applications represent the main modules that constitute
the LogSafe architecture. The Device was developed on both
Windows 10 Professional and Ubuntu 16.04 without any
dependency to SGX (since it is potentially untrusted). All other
modules were developed on Windows 10 Professional using
the Intel SGX SDK 1.8 for Windows2 (currently, Intel SGX
SDK for Linux does not support all the required features such
as monotonic counter operations).
The applications share the same untrusted library that was
developed using Boost Asio 1.65.13 to provide asynchronous
event-driven support across LogSafe. In addition, the Logger
and Tracker applications also load the corresponding enclave
dynamic libraries, logger.dll and tracker.dll respec-
tively. These libraries feature trusted functions (ECALLs) to
be executed inside the enclave, while the applications provide
untrusted functions (OCALLs) to be called from the enclave.
Conceptually, the Device exposes a synchronized AddLog
function, during which it establishes a secure connection with
the Logger (if it does not already exist) and sends the message
over this connection. The Logger and the Tracker share the
same code base but have different event handlers to feature
different purposes. After loading the enclave libraries, they
start to listen on the pre-deﬁned internal port for incoming
2https://software.intel.com/en-us/sgx-sdk/download
3http://www.boost.org/doc/libs/1 65 1/doc/html/boost asio.html
LogSafe messages. The Logger also listens on additional
service port for incoming IoT device’s requests.
LogSafe uses cryptographic primitives from SGX SDK’s
trusted cryptographic library sgx_tcrypto.lib and
OpenSSL library 1.0.2 (with trusted version4 for the enclave
libraries and untrusted version5 for the applications). More
speciﬁcally, LogSafe encrypts data with Rijndael AES-GCM
encryption on 128-bit key size and 96-bit initialization vector.
Logged data are hashed using SHA256 and signed using 256-
bit elliptic curve digital signature algorithm (ECDSA). SGX
SDK also provides 256-bit elliptic curve Difﬁe-Hellman key
exchange algorithm (ECDHE) to establish the secure connec-
tion during remote attestation process. These cryptographic
primitives are provided with resilience to side-channel attacks.
LogSafe makes use of two optimizations to reduce compu-
tation costs on IoT devices:
1) Front-end router: With Chord’s lookup protocol, an IoT
device only needs to know the subnet of LogSafe cluster and
ﬁnds an active node to lookup for its primary Logger node.
To further reduce the time needed for the device to ﬁnd the
correct logger node to start the logging procedure, LogSafe
has a non-SGX Router as the front-end of the system. Each
logger node periodically sends a heartbeat message to the
Router to keep the alive status in the node list. Upon receiving
a request from an IoT device, it will be able to compute
the address of the corresponding logger node and return the
information to the IoT device. It is important to mention that
the Router is not trusted, which means it can return the wrong
information or not reply anything. However, as the correctness
of the matching will be veriﬁed during the handshake protocol,
the IoT device will eventually ﬁnd the correct node following
Chord’s lookup protocol.
2) TLS session resumption: In IoT applications where de-
vices often move around and use unreliable Internet connectiv-
ity, these devices may need to re-establish secure connection
frequently. This communication overhead can be very costly
for IoT devices as shown in Section VI. LogSafe can improve
the TLS performance by keeping the established session state
(represented by OpenSSL’s SSL and I/O stream abstraction
BIO objects) so that an existing device can reuse the previous
session when reconnecting to LogSafe. However, a session
cannot be used forever to ensure forward secrecy. IoT device
can only reuse a session up to a conﬁgurable time before
the device needs to negotiate a new session. The session
state is kept in the enclave and time is measured using the
trusted clock from SGX platform services to ensure security
guarantees.
VI. EVALUATION
In this section, we present the experimental evaluation of
the LogSafe implementation. We ﬁrst discuss the overhead
for setup time before presenting the scalability of LogSafe
in normal operation and in snapshot operation. Finally, we
4https://software.intel.com/sites/default/ﬁles/managed/3b/05/Intel-SgxSSL-
Library-User-Guide.pdf
5https://www.openssl.org/source/
TABLE I: Execution time breakdown of handshake protocol.
Remote attestation is needed only if the Logger does not have
the device’s meta-data and requires provisioning.
Intel Edison Dell 5480 Task Logger
717μs 87μs Device Hello →
← SGX Hello 5,886μs
370,055μs 8,617μs Device Negotiate →
(*) Remote Attestation 1.038s
← SGX Finish 5,935 μs
1.420s 1.059s Total time (with remote attestation)
382.5ms 20.5ms Total time (without remote attestation)
compare LogSafe with previous proposed loggers using both
SGX and non-SGX implementations.
A. Setup Time
Before any IoT device begins to send encrypted data to
LogSafe, it needs to establish a trusted connection with the
Logger enclave as described in Section IV. In this experiment,
we measure the setup time needed until both the IoT device
and LogSafe successfully establish a TLS channel in two
cases: (1) an IoT device connects to LogSafe for the ﬁrst time
(i.e., Logger needs to request provisioning with the Manager);
(2) an IoT device reconnects to the Logger (i.e., this node
already has the device’s meta-data sealed).
In the experimental setup, the Logger and the Man-
ager are installed on two Dell Latitude 5480 laptops, each
with a 2.5GHz Intel Core i5-7200U CPU and 8GB RAM,
running Windows 10 Pro. The client application is exe-
cuted on an Intel Edison board, a computing module with
a 500 MHz Intel Atom and 1GB RAM, running Yocto
Linux. All the parties are conﬁgured with TLS 1.2 and
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 cipher
suite. To quantify the impact of the speciﬁc IoT device
platform on setup time, we also run the client application on
another Dell Latitude 5480 laptop and compare the two times.
All the machines are connected via a 1Gbps switch while the
Intel Edison board is connected via a Wireless Access Point
802.11n 150Mbps on the same switch.
As can be seen from Table I, the setup time is signiﬁcantly
higher if the Logger needs to be provisioned. As described
earlier, the remote attestation procedure not only involves
a communication protocol between the cloud node and the
Manager, but it also requires communication with Intel IAS
server. The current version of IAS requires establishing a TLS
session with a valid client certiﬁcate before any API calls
can be made. In our experiment, it takes almost 600ms to
get the results from Intel IAS server. However, it is important
to emphasize that Logger provisioning is a one-time cost and
does not affect the long-term performance of our system.
RSA-involved operations (i.e., SGX Hello, Device Negoti-
ate, and SGX Finish) need almost equivalent time on both sides
running on Dell laptop. Device Negotiate requires a slightly
higher time because the IoT device needs to not only verify
Fig. 4: LogSafe’s average message processing time with
different conﬁgurations under variant workloads.
the certiﬁcate sent by LogSafe, but also generates its cor-
responding certiﬁcate reply. However, without provisioning,
the overhead is clearly dominated by Device Negotiate on
the lower-computation-power Intel Edison. The results further
conﬁrm the beneﬁts of the TLS session resumption feature as
the overhead only takes place at the beginning of each session
(e.g., once every hour, as in a standard TLS conﬁguration), so
it is not expected to present a computational burden.
B. Logging Performance
Adding security guarantees using SGX increases message
transfer latency. To quantify the impact and evaluate the
beneﬁts of the distributed logger, we set up an experiment to
measure the average message processing time. This experiment
stress tests LogSafe under different cluster conﬁguration: (1) a
single Logger node (with another node functioning as backup
only); (2) two fully functional Logger nodes (i.e., two nodes
processing requests from IoT devices and acting as backup for
each other); (3) three fully functional Logger nodes. We use
Dell Latitude 5480 machines to run the cluster, while another
machine is used to synthetically generate requests (100 bytes
messages) from IoT devices, ranging from 1 to 256 devices.
Figure 4 shows the results. With only one IoT device,
there is no difference between three conﬁgurations with an
average of 3ms per request. This can be explained by the
communication ﬂow in Section IV: LogSafe processes requests
from a device sequentially because the device must receive an
acknowledgment message before sending the next requests.
The multi-threading implementation starts to beneﬁt with two
IoT devices joining the system as the requests can be processed
in parallel, resulting in half processing time.
As the number of IoT devices increases beyond the number
of cores on the single- and double-node systems, the average
processing time for the cluster with three nodes is roughly
an order of magnitude lower (as low as 0.2ms per request).
We also notice that at best performance, the gain from one-
node to other conﬁgurations is not double or triple based
TABLE II: Execution time breakdown of cryptographic functions. Snapshot algorithm only involves hashing, signing, and
counter increment.
Operation
Message Size (bytes)
25 26 27 28 29 210 211 212 213 214
Encryption 0.30 μs 0.30 μs 0.40 μs 0.40 μs 0.50 μs 0.70 μs 1.20 μs 2.10 μs 3.80 μs 7.50 μs
Hash 0.30 μs 0.50 μs 0.80 μs 1.20 μs 2.30 μs 4.20 μs 7.90 μs 15.70 μs 31.00 μs 60.70 μs
Sign 388.92 μs
Counter Increment 152 ms
on the number of nodes. It is because these nodes not only
process incoming requests from IoT devices, they also need to
function as backups for other nodes. Nevertheless, the results
illustrate the beneﬁt of the scalable design of LogSafe – for
any ﬁxed number of IoT devices, the average processing time
per message is bound to greatly decrease as the number of
nodes in the LogSafe cluster increases. To provide a more
practical interpretation of the above results, note that if IoT
devices send data every 1 second, the three-node LogSafe can
support 5000 devices simultaneously.
C. Cryptographic Operation Latency
In this subsection, we measure the effect of the proposed
snapshot algorithm, in which the SGX monotonic counter
is periodically incremented; each counter increment is ex-
pected to be slow due to non-volatile memory interactions.
To quantify this and identify the bottleneck of cryptographic
operations, we measure the latency of each cryptographic
operation, including encryption, hashing, signing, and counter
increment; for more exhaustive evaluation, the message size is
varied from 25 bytes (AES block size) to 214 bytes (maximum
TLS plain text length speciﬁed by TLS speciﬁcation [37]).
Note that the hashchaining algorithm only signs concatenated
hashes and counter values, which have ﬁxed length, so that the
time required for sign operation does not change with message
length.
Table II provides the average time it takes to perform the
logging sub-procedures. In particular, the time needed for
encryption and hashing increases linearly with the message
length. Incrementing the SGX-based counter takes almost
152ms and signing takes 389μs on average, which are much
higher than other operations, as expected. This has a signiﬁcant
effect on snapshot time, resulting in approximately 160ms
per snapshot processing time. However, the typical snapshot
data are only dozen bytes containing the device ID and latest
counter value. In addition, it is expected that Tracker usually
takes snapshot only when a node is shutting down. Thus,
the snapshot algorithm is able to minimize the overhead
introduced by incrementing the monotonic counter.
D. Performance Comparison
Finally, it is important to note the overhead of LogSafe
and discuss the trade-off of using SGX by comparing the
proposed logger with one that does not use SGX, and with
other proposed secure loggers using SGX. In particular, this
Fig. 5: Average message processing time comparison between
LogSafe and other implementations.
experiment aims to measure the average processing time for
100-byte messages by LogSafe in comparison with a logger
implementing the same algorithm without using SGX, and
with an implementation of a single-node SGX-based logger,
referred to as Cloud Logger in this paper, proposed in our
prior work [9]. For LogSafe, we use two cluster conﬁgurations:
single-node and three-node. The non-SGX logger features the
same algorithm but was implemented using Intel Integrated
Performance Primitives Cryptography library6 to fully utilize
AES-NI instructions. Lastly, the CloudLogger is conﬁgured
with a buffer size of 50.
The results are illustrated in Figure 5. As expected, the
non-SGX logger yields the best performance using the same
cluster conﬁguration with LogSafe. At the same time, the
overhead of SGX (namely, enclave boundary data transfer and
different cryptographic implementations) does not appear to
be prohibitive as the average processing time per message is
only about 42% slower – furthermore, the difference in average
processing times is bound to decrease in systems with more
nodes and lower processing times. Thus, LogSafe provides
much better privacy and security guarantees, especially over
cloud adversary, while paying a reasonable price in terms of
performance.
In addition, it can be seen that LogSafe greatly outperforms
6https://software.intel.com/en-us/ipp-crypto-reference
Cloud Logger – LogSafe is more than 10 times faster than the
one-node Cloud Logger which performs a physical counter
increment after every few messages from an IoT device. Note
that Cloud Logger is also very similar to SGX-Log [10],
another single-node SGX-based logger. However, SGX-Log
is executed in Intel SGX SDK for Linux, which does not
support the physical counter increment since all current Linux
versions are not able to interact with physical monotonic
counters and only emulate the counter in software. Hence,
SGX-Log effectively provides weaker security guarantees,
which is why a fair comparison between LogSafe and SGX-
Log is impossible.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we described LogSafe, a cloud-based logger
for the IoT environment that stores secure logs from devices
and allows for forensic analysis in case of an adversarial event.
We used SGX as a trusted hardware to enable the design of the
logger, which guarantees conﬁdentiality and integrity of stored
data and provides tamper-detection of the data. LogSafe is
highly scalable and fault-tolerant with decentralized distributed
logger nodes that can be provisioned on the ﬂy based on
system workload. We leveraged the greater computational
power of SGX to improve on works that attempt secure
logging and to provide stronger security guarantees. LogSafe
is able to defend against three classes of attacks, namely
replay, injection and eavesdropping attacks. Finally, based on
the simulation experiments, the proposed logger is scalable
to support a large number of IoT devices as well as a large
transmission of data.
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